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Abstract
Fiscal adjustments consisting of spending cuts or tax increases are generally presented as
the unavoidable way for achieving public finance sustainability in the long term. However,
this view of fiscal consolidation processes is limited as it leaves out other aspects related
to public sector performance which are relevant not only from the macroeconomic but
also from the microeconomic perspective. This paper models Public Sector Performance
(PSP) by proposing a theoretical framework that integrates the conventional methodology
for measuring its productive efficiency and the monetary assessment of social welfare
changes linked to public policy reforms. Two equivalent measures of social welfare
change generated by improving (or worsening) productive efficiency are deduced using
duality theory. The first is obtained from the cost function, while the second arises directly
from the production function. The results reveal that taking advantage of budgetary
savings obtained from this approach constitutes a valuable tool for designing welfare-
enhancing fiscal consolidation packages, meanwhile promoting sound fiscal balances and
growth prospects over the long term.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, an essential issue to be analysed in depth is the relationship between the productive
efficiency of the public sector and the potential budgetary savings associated with its improvement.
This is true especially for advanced economies in which effects of the current crisis are affecting
public finances in a more evident way. Measurement of these budgetary savings constitutes an al-
ternative fiscal policy tool which goes beyond the traditional view of fiscal consolidation (spendings
cuts or tax hikes). This measure is helpful not only for short-term consolidation but it is required
in order to ensure a sound long-term growth path.
However, as advanced in Pestieau and Tulkens (1993), properly measuring the public sector
performance it is not straightforward prospect. Evaluation of public sector policies, they argue,
requires the use of a multidimensional approach, and it entails a number of other difficulties. First,
the objectives assigned to production units may not be always compatible with one another. Second,
measuring the degree to which those objectives are satisfied will force analytists to introduce some
basic value judgements in order to weigh certain partial indicators. Finally, the trade-off between
allocative and non-allocative objectives may affect management in these public sector units.
Initially, the literature on public sector performance focussed on several issues related to pub-
lic choice theory (collective decision making, lack of competition and rent seeking), in order to
understand the behaviour of public decision-makers (politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists, etc.).1 Af-
terwards, since the late 1980s, the measurement of productive efficiency has attracted increasing
interest within the public economics area.2 This trend is even more evident for some specific sec-
tors typically provided by the public sector -health, education, social care, etc.-.3 This growing
literature has mainly focussed on developing quantitative methodologies (usually grouped into para-
metric and non-parametric methods) from which we may achieve empirical measures of technical,
allocative or overall efficiency with which a number of units (assumed to be homogeneous) have
produced the public good(s) and service(s). Thus, all these measures usually provide us with one
scenario to compare, in relative terms, the performance of these above mentioned public units.
1See Wilson (1989), Hettich and Winer (1993), Wolf (1993), Horn (1995) and Mueller (2003), among others, for
further explanations about the topics dealt with from the point of view of this literature -government size, budgetary
incrementalism, X-inefficiency, etc.-.
2See, among others, Afonso et al. (2005, 2010a, 2010b), Borge et al. (2008) and Casiraghi et al. (2009) for
cross-country quantitative analyses on overall public sector performance and efficiency.
3See Clements (2002) and Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) for illustrative applications providing public policy-specific
efficiency scores.
2
However, as Pestieau (2009) highlighted, it is not simple to move from theoretical concepts
to empirical assessments, when dealing with issues related to the public sector efficiency. The
difficulties derive from both the conceptual and feasibility perspectives. On the one hand, it has
not thus far been established how to break up the sources of allocative and technical efficiency or
the relationship that exists between them. For instance, a poor allocation of resources may prove
unfavorable to achieving high scores for technical efficiency. On the other hand, the lack of full
availability of data (on inputs prices, for instance) may condition how we measure public sector
efficiency. In this respect, analysts compare ideal and real-world assumptions to deal with this issue
and to determine what may be done under each scenario. Fundamentals of this literature underlie
the construction of our theoretical proposal. Surely, these contributions measuring the productivity
of public services are very useful to improving the management of public resources. Nonetheless,
we believe there is lack of literature connecting these results with the potential budgetary gains
that may arise from a reduction of public sector inefficiency.
In this vein, the OECD (2011) has highlighted the importance of implementing reforms to
increase the efficiency of public spending, specially for governments that are currently facing ex-
traordinary budgetary imbalances. Among others, the OECD refers to the need to improve the
productivity of public spending on education and health. In the first case, it is estimated that the
gradual adoption of best practices in primary and secondary education could save resources equal to
around 0.5% of GDP (with different countries ranging from 0.2 % to 1.2%), without compromising
current educational targets. In the case of health, the resources released by improvements in pro-
ductive efficiency could be even higher, at around 2% of GDP (between 0.4% and 4.8% in the full
range). Along those same lines, the OECD (2015) highlights how the Great Recession has created
an increasingly complex environment for governance, limited fiscal space, and growing demands for
transparency and accountability. Against this background, governments are continually challenged
to demonstrate better performance and management of available resources.
Furthermore, we believe that monetary gains could be significant in terms of social welfare. In
this respect, it is important to account for not only budgetary savings but also the monetary gains
in terms of income and wealth derived from a better education and health practices. Moreover,
from a marginal cost of public funds perspective, we should also consider the resources released due
to the reduction in deadweight losses caused by distortionary.
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework which consistently allows for in-
tegration of the conventional methodology for measuring productive efficiency and the monetary
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assessment of social welfare changes related to the public sector performance. In particular, we de-
duce two measures of social welfare changes generated by an improvement (or decline) in productive
efficiency associated with the procurement of a public good. The first measure is obtained from
the cost function, or in other words, from the supply side, while the second arises directly from the
production function. According to duality theory, both measures are equivalent and drawn from
the same set of information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we introduce our theoreti-
cal framework, on the basis of conventional measures of productive efficiency using Farrell’s radial
approach. In the third section, we present our integrated approach which combines different di-
mensions typically involved in policy-makers decisions (welfare changes, measures of inefficiencies,
etc.). Finally, the last section presents our conclusions.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Recent concerns around Public Sector Efficiency
The monitoring of public sector activity and the potential derivation of measures of Public Sector
Efficiency (PSE) clearly justify the increasing interest of analyses related to Public Sector Per-
formance (PSP). This section briefly discusses the recent evolution of literature focussed on PSE,
which refers to the efficient allocation and production of the public good and services. The existing
literature is comprised of alternative approaches with which to measure, and evaluate, the PSP
and (consequently) the PSE. Here we present a non exhaustive description of how this literature
has evolved. Firstly, a growing number of studies (Afonso et al., 2005 and 2010b, Borge et al.
2008, and Clements, 2002, among others) translated the traditional approach used to analyse the
productive efficiency of firms to the case of public sector units (countries, municipalities, schools,
hospitals, etc.) with the aim of obtaining empirical measures of the PSE for a set of units and
rank them. Secondly, certain studies (Borge et al. 2008, among others) have further explored the
identification of determinants of these empirical measures. An alternative perspective is considered
by other authors (see Afonso et al., 2010a, Casiraghi et al., 2009, among others) in order to include
the distributional concerns traditionally linked to public sector activity into the efficiency analysis.
All in all, it can be observed that some caveats remain necessary. Most of these analyses
have focussed on productive efficiency or technical efficiency (ψ) have left out of their analysis
issues related to allocative efficiency (γ), a relevant component of overall efficiency (η). This latter
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measure is our main interest in this paper. Second, the distributional concern has not yet been
fully incorporated into analysis, although it is a component involved in policy-maker decisions.
Our paper aims to supersede these caveats by combining the elements presented; (i) empirical
measures of efficiency, (ii) welfare impact and distributional concerns, and (iii) a monetary valuation
of inefficiencies measured.
2.2 The public sector
This section introduces the notation used in subsequent sections and models the Public Sector
Performance according to a framework which could be adapted to very different analyses.
Our model can be briefly described as follows. The public sector produces a vector of goods
and services (Y =
(
y1, ..., yH
)
) which we consider excludable unlike pure public goods4. Each yh
is produced by a public agency with the corresponding production function for the case of single
output, such that,
yh = fh (X) (1)
where X = (x1, ..., xn) is a vector of n inputs including fixed capital required for the activity
and fh ∈ S = {(X,Y ) : X can produce Y } with S representing the set of technologies.
The unitary price for each of these n inputs are included in the vector W = (w1, ..., wn).
Consequently, the total cost of producing yh (ch) is defined:
ch
(
yh
)
=
∑
xiwi (2)
Assuming H = 1, for the sake of clarity in the presentation, this theoretical framework allows us
to introduce the notation used in posterior sections by formally defining all the standard concepts
of efficiency mentioned above from the input-oriented perspective.5 First, departing from Farrell’s
(1957) efficiency approach, given the minimum quantity of inputs needed for producing the level of
output Y (X∗), technical efficiency (ψ) is defined as the ratio between X and X∗, such that,
ψ =
‖X∗‖
‖X‖ (3)
4Rivalry and excludability are assumed to consistently reflect changes in the demand observed for each public
good.
5Analogous definitions can be found in the literature according to the output-oriented measures (see Coelli, 2005)
for a detailed comparison of both approaches). There are no divergences in the analyses carried out from both
perspectives. Therefore, one of them can be excluded.
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where ‖·‖ represents the euclidean norm.6
Second, given the combination of inputs producing Y at the minimum cost (X∗∗), the allocative
efficiency (γ) is defined as the following ratio:
γ =
‖X∗∗‖
‖X∗‖ (4)
Third, the overall efficiency can be defined as the product of expressions (3) and (4):
η =
‖X∗∗‖
‖X‖ (5)
Finally, we derive the corresponding expression for η in terms of production costs7:
η =
c∗∗
c
(6)
where c and c∗∗ are, respectively, the actual level of production costs and the production costs
corresponding to X∗∗, the efficient combination of inputs when producing Y , from the technical
and the allocative perspective.
3 PSE analysis: an integrated approach
3.1 The ”expenditure-efficiency” function
The framework described above can be observed from a different perspective, in order to consider
the dual version of the same problem. Under these circumstances, a given level of public output
(yˆh) may be explained by the corresponding expenditure function (c(yˆh)), and the degree of overall
efficiency (η(yˆh)). In other words, given the vector input prices (W ), we can define an ”expenditure-
efficiency” function (φ) which is implicit in the conventional production function with productive
factors:
yˆh = f (X)|W → yˆh = φ (c, η)|W (7)
First of all, from (6), we can express the budgetary cost of producing a quantity of public goods
(yˆh) from the vector of inputs (X∗∗) and the degree of overall efficiency reached in the productive
process, η:
c (yˆh) = η−1
∑n
i=1
x∗∗i wi (8)
6Alternative approaches to the concept of productive efficiency would imply consideration of other definitions of
norm. However, the subsequent formalization is valid for any alternative distance definition (and its respective norm).
7A proof of this equivalence between output and cost-oriented efficiency approaches can be seen in Coelli (2005).
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Second, by applying the inverse function theorem to the optimal technology f∗∗h , the optimal
quantities of each input (x∗∗i ) to produce yˆh are obtained. Note that these values only depend on
factor prices and technological parameters of the production function:
x∗∗i = f
∗∗
h
−1 (yˆh ,W ) , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} (9)
Next, by combining (8) and (9), and solving for yˆh we derive the expenditure-efficiency function
φ, as proposed:
yˆh = φ (c (yˆh) , η)|W (10)
The latter expression shows that the optimal provision of this public good depends not only on
the cost of producing it (actual public expenditure), but also the degree of efficiency with which
it is produced (by the public agency). Empirical studies that analyse Public Sector Performance
(PSP) from a public expenditure approach must bear this fact in mind.
3.2 Changes in the PSE, welfare impact and monetary valuation
This section presents an integrated approach which allows us to integrate the different dimensions
involved in the evaluation of Public Sector Performance; (i) changes in the degree of efficiency, (ii)
welfare impacts linked to public policies, and (iii) monetary valuation of effects. The latter may
facilitate the understanding of the inefficiency costs. Moreover, an improvement in the degree of
efficiency will help to provide the same public good or service but with a lower level of spending.
For the sake of clarification, we detail our assumptions. First, in the following analysis it is
assumed that any change in the degree of efficiency is exogenous. Nevertheless, as Gibbons (2005)
posits, the existence of internal disturbances within the organizations (miscoordination, lack of
incentives, etc.) may be the source of inefficiencies. Second, the social welfare generated by con-
sumption of public good (y) is measured in monetary value in the conventional way; that is, by
computing the area under the curve of demand for the good and subtracting the cost of the inputs
used in its production8. Additionally, to obtain accurate measurements of changes in consumer
welfare we assume the demand functions involved to be compensated9. All in all, this theoretical
framework contributes to measure welfare impacts linked to changes (improvement/worsening) in
8Note that, as in previous sections, the notation is simplified to a single public good y to highlight the underlying
intuitions.
9See Willig (1976) for a discussion of the accurate measurement of these areas.
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the degree of efficiency (η) with which the public good is produced.10 Starting from Myrick-Freeman
and Harrington’s (1990) analysis framework for private goods, we next introduce productive effi-
ciency concerns about public production in the evaluation of its social welfare impact in monetary
terms.
Thus, using our ”expenditure-efficiency” function defined in (10), we can define the following
social welfare function:
Ω = Ω (X,W, η) =
∫ y
0
p(u)du−
∑n
i=1
xiwi (11)
where p (·) is the compensated demand function specified in its inverse form.
From (11) we obtain the first order conditions with respect to the inputs used (xi), such that,
∂Ω
∂xi
= p(y)
∂y
∂xi
− wi = 0, i = 1, ..., n (12)
which determine the input demand functions x∗∗i (wi, η) for all i. This should be noted here that
these values are precisely those corresponding to the optimal vector of production factors, X∗∗. It
allows us to compute the optimal output level of public good for a given level of overall efficiency,
y∗∗ (η)|W = ϕ (x∗∗i (wi, η) , η) (13)
Likewise, we can define the social welfare function associated with the production of this public
good by considering the overall efficiency (η) as main argument:
Ω (η)|W = $ (x∗∗i (wi, η) , η) (14)
Applying the envelope theorem to the algebraic analysis described above, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The net welfare gain is the value of the marginal contribution, in monetary terms,
brought about by a reduction (or increase) of overall inefficiency in the production function, so that,
∂Ω (η)
∂η
= p(y∗∗)
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
−
∑n
i=1
wi
∂x∗∗i (·, η)
∂η
= p(y∗∗)ϕη (x∗∗i (wi, η) , η) (15)
Some interesting implications follow. First, this result defines a relationship between the pro-
duction function and the changes in welfare computed in the light of modification of the degree of
efficiency. Second, it can be observed that, under full productivity of all inputs, the value generated
10Hereafter, we consider a generic public good in order to simplify the notation. Thus, we avoid the superscript
”h” used so far to refer to different public goods.
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by an infinitesimal improvement in productive efficiency is explained by the increase in the output
generated. Third, from a different perspective, this gain could be seen as a closer approximation
(ϕη) to the optimal technology (x
∗∗
i ).
Next, the dual version of this result is achieved. To do this, from (13) one can define the cost
functions related to this production as a function of the optimal level of public good, the vector of
inputs associated with the optimal technology, and the degree of overall efficiency reached, so that,
c (η) = c (y∗∗ (η) , η) (16)
Accordingly, considering the difference between consumer surplus and producer quasi-rents, we
can rewrite (11) as,
Ω (y∗∗, η) =
∫ y∗∗
0
p(u)du− c (y∗∗, η) (17)
Note that y∗∗ guarantees that social welfare is maximized given that the price equals the
marginal cost of public good (equilibrium first order condition).11
p(y∗∗) =
∂c (y∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗
(18)
Again, combining (17) and (18), the following proposition emerges.
Proposition 2 The net welfare gain (loss) is the value of the marginal contribution, in mone-
tary terms, brought about by the reduction (increase) of production cost as a consequence of an
improvement (worsening) of the degree of overall inefficiency
∂Ω (y∗∗, η)
∂η
= −∂c (y
∗∗, η)
∂η
(19)
Proof. Given (17), we compute the total derivative with respect to the degree of efficiency (η).
That is,
dΩ (y∗∗, η)
dη
=
∂Ω (y∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂η
+
∂Ω (y∗∗, η)
∂η
(20)
where:
∂Ω (y∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗
= p (y∗∗)− ∂c (y
∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗
(21)
and
∂Ω (y∗∗, η)
∂η
= p (y∗∗)
∂y∗∗
∂η
−
(
∂c (y∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂η
+
∂c (y∗∗, η)
∂η
)
(22)
11Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, we will not explicitly notate the dependence between the optimal level of
output (y∗∗) and the degree of overall efficiency (η).
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Firstly, as a consequence of (18), we could identify dΩ(y
∗∗,η)
dη and
∂Ω(y∗∗,η)
∂η . Next, from (22),
grouping conveniently and again using (18), we obtain the proposition.
Corollary 1 An improvement in the degree of overall inefficiency always involves an increase in
social welfare.
From this set of results, some interesting conclusions can be derived. First, this result defines
a relationship between the cost function and the changes in welfare computed when the degree
of efficiency is modified. Second, the infinitesimal improvements in productive efficiency obtained
lead to a reduction in the cost of production and, consequently, they are welfare enhancing. Third,
combining propositions 1 and 2 we obtain that the two welfare measures proposed must coincide
due to the duality in the relationship between the production function and the cost function, which
is underlying in (7).
3.3 Distributional issues
In this subsection, we analyse how the welfare gains from increased efficiency affect consumers of
public goods and public sector itself as the producer. In this respect, we first identify the efficiency
gains effects on consumer welfare. Let ΩC be the measure of consumer surplus used (usually
equivalent or compensatory variation), so that,
ΩC (η) =
∫ y∗∗(η)
0
p(u)du− p(y∗∗ (η))y∗∗ (η) (23)
Then, the consumer’s marginal gain is,
∂ΩC
∂η
= p(y∗∗ (η))
∂y∗∗
∂η
− ∂p(y
∗∗)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂η
y∗∗ (η)− p(y∗∗ (η))∂y
∗∗
∂η
(24)
And simplifying,
∂ΩC
∂η
= −∂p(y
∗∗)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂η
y∗∗ (η) (25)
Now, from the producer’s perspective, we repeat a similar strategy. First, we define the pro-
ducer’s surplus in terms of η:
ΩS (η) = p(y∗∗ (η))y∗∗ (η)− c (y∗∗, η)
∑n
i=1
x∗∗i wi (26)
where x∗∗i is determined by the n input demand functions, x
∗∗
i (wi, η).
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Again, the producer’s marginal gain can be obtained by differentiating the previous expression:
∂ΩS
∂η
=
∂p(y∗∗)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂η
y∗∗ (η) + p(y∗∗ (η))
∂y∗∗
∂η
− ∂c (y
∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂η
− ∂c (y
∗∗, η)
∂η
(27)
Taking into account equation (18), we find that
∂ΩS
∂η
= −∂c (y
∗∗, η)
∂η
+
∂p(y∗∗)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
y∗∗ (η) (28)
In light of these definitions, the following can be stated.
Proposition 3 An improvement in the degree of overall inefficiency always leads to an increase
in consumer welfare. By contrast, this welfare gain is not guaranteed in the case of producers of
public goods.
Proof. On the one hand, for consumers, this proof can be reduced to check the signs of the
expressions mentioned above. As ∂p(y
∗∗)
∂y∗∗ ≤ 0 and y (η) > 0, depending on the sign of ∂y
∗∗(η)
∂η the
consumer’s net welfare gain will be positive or negative. The optimal vector of inputs (from the
technological and minimisation of cost perspectives) is taken as presented in (13). As a consequence,
in equilibrium a reduction of inefficiency may lead to a decreased level of output. To clarify this
latter statement, we differentiate the first order conditions mentioned in (18) to achieve the following
expression:
∂p(y∗∗)
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
=
∂2c(y∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗2
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
+
∂2c(y∗∗, η)
∂y∗∗∂η
(29)
Grouping conveniently:
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
=
∂2c(y∗∗,η)
∂y∗∗∂η
∂p(y∗∗)
∂y∗∗ − ∂
2c(y∗∗,η)
∂y∗∗2
On the one hand, looking at the denominator, it is straightforward to establish that ∂p(y
∗∗)
∂y∗∗ −
∂2c(y∗∗,η)
∂y∗∗2 < 0. On the other hand, any improvement in η lead to reductions in costs. Thus,
∂2c(y∗∗,η)
∂y∗∗∂η < 0 and, consequently,
∂y∗∗(η)
∂η is always positive.
All in all, we have proven that increases in consumer welfare can be derived from the response
in the production costs to an improvement in overall efficiency.
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On the other hand, for producers, using the price-elasticity of public good demand, defined as
ε = p(y
∗∗)
y∗∗ ∂p(y
∗∗)
∂x
, which is negative by definition, we can prove that ∂Ω
S
∂η will be negative if and only
if ∂y
∗∗(η)
∂η > ε
∂c(y∗∗,η)
∂η
p .
Under these conditions, the difference between the social welfare change and the variation in
the consumer surplus would be negative. Therefore, there is no guarantee of obtaining welfare gains
for producers.
From Proposition 3, the distribution of welfare gains derived from an improvement in the degree
of efficiency may be established. Our results indicate that the determinants are the optimal output
response to this increase and the price-elasticity of demand. In short, two different possibilities are
achieved:
(i) 0 <
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
< ε
∂c(y∗∗,η)
∂η
p
⇔ ∂Ω
C
∂η
> 0,
∂ΩS
∂η
> 0 (30)
(ii) ε
∂c(y∗∗,η)
∂η
p
<
∂y∗∗ (η)
∂η
⇔ ∂Ω
C
∂η
> 0,
∂ΩS
∂η
< 0 (31)
3.4 Social Welfare changes over time
In order to show a different perspective on the conclusions described so far, we now consider an
example to illustrate (and reinforce) the underlying intuition. We consider a scenario in which
the overall efficiency to produce the public good y improves between two moments in time (t = 0,
t = 1), from η0 to η1. To quantify the value of social welfare generated by the change in the
degree of efficiency, we may choose to integrate one of the two welfare change measures presented
in Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, and use [η0, η1] as integration interval:
∆Ω =
∫ η1
η0
p(y∗∗ (η))ϕη (x∗∗i (wi, η) , η) dη = −
∫ η1
η0
c(y∗∗ (η) , η)dη (32)
The direct quantification of ∆Ω from either of the two alternatives shown in (32) requires
determination of the changes in the equilibrium output and in the optimal combination of inputs
caused by the change in the degree of efficiency.
Contrarily, this computation may be simplified when information is available on production
levels of the public good before and after the change analysed. To do this, using (11), we simply
need to calculate the difference between initial and final social welfare values
∆Ω =
∫ y1
0
p(u)du− c(y1, η1)−
∫ y0
0
p(u)du+ c(y0, η0) (33)
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By using this quantification, one can observe how the potential welfare gains resulting from
improved efficiency come from the displacement of the supply curve (as there is a reduction in the
cost function). In other words, the marginal cost of producing public good goes from ∂c(y,η0)∂y to
∂c(y,η1)
∂y .
We can obtain an alternative expression for (33) by incorporating the change experienced by
the cost function. To do this, we use the line integral of its gradient along any path between (x0, η0)
and (x1, η1), and integrate along the line connecting them, such that
12:
∆Ω =
∫ y1
y0
p(u)du−
∫ η1
η0
∂c(y0, η)
∂η
dη −
∫ y1
y0
∂c(y1, η)
∂y
dy (34)
Figure 1 shows in the green area the net social welfare gain expressed in (34). For the sake of
simplicity, we assume linearity for all the curves involved; both compensated public good demand,
and marginal cost functions (pre and post).
According to the analysis presented above, we could additionally define welfare changes expe-
rienced by consumers and the public sector as public good supplier. On the one hand, consumers
enhance their welfare by increasing the area under the compensated demand curve, as a consequence
of the equilibrium price decrease, from p0 to p1.
Figure 2 shows the consumers welfare gain, which is represented by the total blue area. On the
other hand, the blue squared area represents the net change in producer welfare, which results from
compensating for the decrease in the initial surplus due to a lower resulting price, whereas the red
area refers to the new surplus caused by the reduction of costs charted in the new marginal cost
function.
As a consequence, combining this graphical evidence with propositions presented above, we
conclude that:
(i) For any η > 0, ∆Ω = ∆ΩC +
(
∆ΩS −∇ΩS) > 0.
(ii) We have no guarantee implying that
(
∆ΩS −∇ΩS) > 0.
4 Potential empirical implementation
One purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated theoretical framework which may support
comprehensive empirical analyses measuring public sector efficiency. This section aims to discuss
how the theoretical framework described in previous sections may be translated to future empirical
12See Myrick-Freeman and Harrington (1990) for further details on the underlying method, which is outside the
scope of this paper.
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applications. However, as Pestieau (2009) pointed out, it is not straightforward to move from
theoretical concepts to empirical assessments, when dealing with issues related to public sector
efficiency.
The difficulties derive from both conceptual and feasibility perspectives. On the one hand, it
has not been so far established how to break down the sources of allocative and technical efficiency,
or the relationship that exists between them. For instance, a poor allocation of resources may
prove unfavorable to achieving high scores of technical efficiency. On the other hand, the lack of
full availability of data (on input prices, for instance) may condition how we empirically quantify
the public sector efficiency. In this respect, they compare both ideal and real-world assumptions to
deal with this issue and finally determine which may be done under each scenario.
Interestingly for a policy-oriented exercise, the potential empirical implementation of the pro-
posal presented in this paper would lead to monetary valuations measuring the changes in the overall
efficiency. Moreover, our framework integrates elements related to efficiency as wells as those re-
lated to distribution (to the extent to which this paper revisits the efficiency-equity trade-off). We
consider that the current state of the art could adequately deal with these empirical challenges,
both when measuring the performance of public units and when estimating the functions involved.
Particularly, the following information would be required: (i) a vector containing the unitary price
for each input, (ii) an estimation of the demand function and, finally, (iii) an estimation of the
production function (cost function) in the primal (dual) approach.
Logically, we are aware that implementation of our proposal requires some ”extra” information
about prices. In this sense, recent studies have wisely dealt with this caveat (i.e. Gronberg et
al., 2012).13. In this paper the authors estimate a translog stochastic cost frontier model using
panel data for charter campuses and traditional public campuses in Texas over the five-year period
2005-2009. The authors model expenditures per pupil as a function of three output indicators (q),
two measures of input prices (w) and five environmental factors (x).
Furthermore, another decision that must be made is which efficiency measurement methodology
is preferable according to the characteristics of the analysis. In this regard, Data Envelopment Anal-
ysis (DEA), Free Disposal Hull (FDH), econometric/stochastic, and semi-parametric approaches
have been extensively applied although we focus here on information requirements as a key ele-
13The description of specific alternatives to overcome this difficulty goes beyond the scope of this theoretical
analysis.
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5 Concluding remarks
In light of the current economic situation, the near future points to intense (supra-/intra-) national
social debates on the monitoring of public sector performance (health, education, etc.). In partic-
ular, advanced economies are currently facing issues related to the reorganization of their welfare
state. Within this framework, quantifying these budgetary savings strongly constitute an alterna-
tive fiscal policy tool which goes beyond the traditional view of fiscal consolidation (spending cuts
or tax hikes). This measure is helpful not only for short-term consolidation but it is required in
order to ensure a sound long-term growth path.
In this respect, important policy implications can be derived from our results. First, this
paper has presented an integrated approach which combines different dimensions involved in the
usual policy-maker decisions (efficiency in the production of a given public good, welfare impacts,
and monetary valuation). This proposal satisfies additional features in comparison to the usual
methodologies. Mainly, our approach would allow translation of measures of (in)efficiencies into to
a monetary value. Second, our proposal may be adapted for use within a wide variety of empirical
applications monitoring and/or evaluating public sector performance. For instance, this approach
may provide guidance to the design of fiscal consolidation programs, so that they are compatible
with a more efficient use of public resources. Finally, we have derived some analytical results which
assist in the understanding of the underlying intuitions and their linkages.
To conclude, some interesting lessons can be extracted regarding the application of this approach
to empirical analyses. First, the final results would lead to monetary valuations of the changes in
the overall efficiency, which would prove a very interesting tool from the policy-maker perspective.
Second, our approach integrates elements related to efficiency with others related to equity, allowing
us to explore this classic trade-off. Third, this approach requires an estimate of production function
as well the cost function, which may limit its application when information on the production
procedure and/or the production cost is limited. However, as mentioned in section 4, existing
literature discusses how to deal with major data requirements.. All in all, each of these issues
should be decided taking into account the specific features of the public service provision under
analysis.
14See Adam et al. (2011) as an illustration of the combined application of these methods.
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Welfare impact brought by a PSE gain.
Figure 2: Welfare impact brought by a PSE gain. Distributional issues.
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